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INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICTS
GWON A. G. GormiB

The international law of humanitarian assistance to victims
of domestic armed conflicts had been sadly neglected until very
recently. The recrudescence of deadly civil strife in the 1960's

leading to the decimation of more than two million unarmed men,
women and children in Nigeria, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and
elsewhere poses a major challenge to international law and to the
United Nations. The intolerable level of suffering of civilian populations requires a reexamination of the law and practice of the
international community which has so far done little to help the
victims of such conflicts. It also requires a consideration of proposals
for effective action by the community of nations.
Before considering the legal issues, mention should be made
of the erosion of moral standards in an international community
one of whose policy goals is reputedly the establishment of a world
public order based upon the freedom and dignity of the individual.
Incidents that a century ago rocked governments, such as the
massacre of Christians in Bulgaria or the slaughter of Armenians
in the Ottoman Empire, now do not even provoke an official
reaction.
The toleration of atrocities by allies out of alleged respect for
a national interest or for the sovereignty of states has now reached
dimensions threatening the legitimacy of the international legal
order itself. The decline of our civilization may well be measured
by reference to the growing gap between professed human ideals
solemnly affirmed in international instruments and the growing
brutalization of civilians in armed conflicts. It can be measured by
reference to the ever more frequent disregard of the unchallenged
rule of international law that non-combatants must not be made
the object of attacks unrelated to military operations and directed
exclusively against them.' A number of factors have contributed to
this decline.
0

Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. See, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2516, TI.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.
T.S. 287. See GA. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028

(1970).
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First, the modern technology of warfare is not designed to
differentiate between civilians and combatants. Aerial bombardments, nuclear weapons, antipersonnel and fragmentation bombs,
defoliation, napalm, and sensor devices characteristic of automated
warfare, kill and maim all living beings in designated target areas
without regard to their combat status.
Second, the concept of total war, the policies of warfare in
developing countries, wars of national liberation and guerrilla strategies all call for people's wars which pit men, women and indeed
children against technologically superior adversaries. When an
entire population wages war, the whole population becomes the
enemy, with all the genocidal potentialities of such a conflict. The
concept of a military target then becomes increasingly broad.
Third, the ideology of terror and of guerrilla action condones
acts designated to horrify, terrorize and galvanize public opinion
for political ends in the conduct of popular wars.
Fourth, the media, and particularly television, communicate
to home audiences the horror of armed conflict and gradually
immunize public opinion to a surfeit of atrocities committed in
every part of the world. Shared guilt and vicarious participation
of television audiences in violence against enemy towns and villages
may induce a psychological urge to avoid responsibility altogether,
as well as a feeling of helplessness in the face of the magnitude of
the suffering.
Fifth, the moralistic and legalistic condemnation of all warfare
coupled with an awareness of its unmitigated horror, has led some
to resist attempts to "civilize" war in order to heighten opposition
to warfare. The relative neglect of humanitarian law may well be
attributable in part to this attitude.
Sixth, the brutal conditions of life in many developing countries and popular attitudes of fatalistic helplessness may condition
populations to submit to their destiny without great outcry.
Seventh, ruthless totalitarian regimes, which are sometimes
allied to Western governments and which do not hesitate to
annihilate potential internal adversaries, are not likely to be more
concerned about the fate of hostile civilian populations than about
the destiny of their domestic adversaries.
Eighth, political philosophies subserving all humanitarian considerations to "just" political struggles, and which put political
construction on humanitarian initiatives, have multiplied the political costs of genuine humanitarian action.
Ninth, the fear of direct involvement in foreign conflicts now
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inhibits the offer of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations
abroad.
The convergence of these factors and the growing incidence
of serious conflicts have created a major challenge requiring a
determined response. The legal dimensions of this challenge are
concealed behind ambiguous juridical arrangements. They are
concealed behind competing legal standards and principles both
permitting and prohibiting international action for the protection
of civilians in armed conflicts.
I. CONFLIrING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Balanced sets of principles compete against one another in
regulating international humanitarian action in domestic conflicts. 2
Some inhibit and prohibit outside interference while others permit
and even require international action. A number of leading principles inhibit international action: individuals are not subjects of
international law and bear neither rights nor duties under it;
intervention in the domestic affairs of states is inadmissible; competent regional organizations are taking measures which should not
be duplicated by international action.. Principles which permit
international action are no less numerous: rules of traditional international law permitting humanitarian intervention; 3 others authorizing action to protect nationals; 4 obligations under treaties and
human rights instruments;5 and, more recently, recommendations
of the United Nations calling for measures in the human rights
field and for assistance to civilians in armed conflicts.6
A. Legal Barriers to HumanitarianAssistance in Civil Wars
1. The Status of Individuals
The first of the theories inhibiting international humanitarian
assistance is closely related to the legal barriers of sovereignty and
2. 2 Georg Schwartzenberger, International Law, The Law of Armed Conflict
(1968); R. Pinto, Les R.gles du Droit International Concernant la Guerre Civilc
in 114 Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours (1965); G. Gottlieb.
The togic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality
(1968) for a discussion of jurisprudential questions raised by competing principles
in a legal system.
3. 1 Oppenheim. International Law 280, 584 (8th ed. H. Lautcrpacht ed.
1955).
4. Id. at 276.
5. Id. at 280.
6. See G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
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domestic jurisdiction. Under traditional doctrines of international
law, only states are the bearers of rights and duties, while individuals
have no claim to the protection of other states or to that of the
international community, save as may be otherwise expressly provided for by international conventions and agreements such as the
Geneva Red Cross Conventions. 7 This doctrine is confirmed by
the absence of international judicial remedies for individuals in
disputes with states. The doctrine developed against the background
of humanitarian intervention by European powers in the nineteenth
century8 and the eradication of slavery and the slave trade by international efforts. 9 It followed upon international action in the wake
of massacres of Bulgar, Serb, Armenian and Greek populations in
areas under Ottoman rule. 10
The theory that individuals bear neither rights nor duties under
international law is becoming a matter of historical interest only.
The events of World War II have led to the acceptance of the principle, enshrined in the Charter and judgment of the International
Military Tribunal of Niirnberg," that individuals have both rights
and duties directly under international law. Numerous covenants,
codes, draft codes, resolutions, declarations and conventions unanimously approved by the United Nations General Assembly clearly
affirm the principle that the individual is the bearer of rights and
duties under international law, which states are obliged to respect,
protect and promote. 12 The International Conference on Human
Rights held in Teheran in 1968 thus proclaimed the need for direct
7. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Conven.
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.IA.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.IA.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
8. 1 Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 280.
9. Id. at 584, 664-67.
10. See E. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (1927).
11. The Charter and Judgment of the Niirnberg Tribunal-History and Analysi§, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949).
12. See e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 18th Report of
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations and
Human Rights (1968).
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international action by every possible means to eradicate gross
denials of human rights under the policy of apartheid.13 It also
proclaimed that gross denials of human rights arising from discrimination on grounds of race, religion, belief or expression of
opinion, "outrage the conscience of mankind and endanger the
foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world."14 Moreover,
the International Conference solemnly proclaimed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community.10 It weakened remainhag doubts as to the binding character of obligations assumed by
states in the Declaration.
2. Sovereignty and Domestic Jurisdiction
The concept of sovereignty as a barrier to humanitarian
assistance has recently been reinforced in United Nations practice.
Article 2(7) of the Charter, provides that, "Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State...." Attempts to develop this principle have taken several
forms. The Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States was
directed to widen the area of agreement that had been established
by the General Assembly in its Declaration on the Inadmissability
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty,16 which was itself grounded
on Article 2(7) of the Charter. In this Declaration, the Assembly
declared that,
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any
other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other
forms of interference or .attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural
7
elements are condemned.'
While the legal status of this resolution has been contested by
13. International Conference on Human Rights, The Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, at 4 (1968).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. GA. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965);
see also Onuf, The Principle of Non-Intervention, The U.N. and the International System, 25 International Organization 209 (1971).
17. GA. Res. 2131, supra note 16, at 12.
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Western powers, it nevertheless expresses a strong resurgence of
sentiment in the international community against intervention of
any kind by Member States or by the Organization itself in the
domestic affairs of Member States. These principles were reaffirmed
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States adopted by the
8
Twenty-Fifth General Assembly.'
3. Regionalism
Another legal barrier that has been raised to bar United Nations
intervention of all kinds, including humanitarian intervention, is
the concept of regionalism: the claim that a situation, which might
otherwise lend itself to United Nations action, is the object of
measures taken by a regional organization which has pre-empted
jurisdiction and which should alone be permitted to deal with it.
This claim has been raised by the United States in the Security
Council in connection with the situation in the Dominican Republic.1 The Security Council was discussing a recommendation
that the role of the United Nations Observer in the Dominican
Republic be enlarged to permit him to investigate alleged violations
of human rights. The United States objected that the United
Nations Observer had not requested such powers and that the
Organization of American States Commission on Human Rights
should continue to investigate such human rights cases. Ambassador
Stevenson argued against duplication by the United Nations of the
effort of the Organization of American States.
In connection with the civil war in Nigeria the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations expressed support for the actions
taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and did not
propose that the humanitarian issues be considered by the General
Assembly. He stated that he would be guided by decisions of the
OAU which was dealing with the situation. He indicated, however,
that the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
(UNICEF), the World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were facilitating the shipment of
food and medical supplies to the stricken people of Biafra.20
The Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the Federal
Military Government of Nigeria, appointed a Special Representative
to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities, who reported to him on the
18. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
19. 20 U.N. SCOR, 1196th meeting 17 (1965).
20. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. VI, No. 5, at 79 (1969).
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relief and humanitarian aspects of the situation.2 1 Subsequently, the
Representative, in his capacity as Observer and at the request of the
Government, travelled throughout the war-affected areas in Nigeria
in order to report to the Secretary-General on the situation there
and on the behavior of the Federal troops. The OAU also adopted
a resolution 22 calling upon all parties to cooperate with a view to
ensuring the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid to all in need of it.
It did not, however, invite states to make transportation, food and
medicine available in adequate quantities for the needs of the
civilian population. The Secretary-General was severely criticized for
not doing more to protect the civilian population in the secessionist
Territory.2 3
A number of doctrines thus act as a brake on humanitarian
intervention by the United Nations and by individual states in
situations in which civilian populations face decimation. These
doctrines express the interest of states in the protection of their
freedom of action from outside interference in domestic and in
international conflicts. While these doctrines would not perhaps
by themselves deter international action in situations in which the
vital interests of other states are at stake, they are successful in
holding back truly humanitarian involvement. These doctrines
therefore reinforce the natural weight of inertia which bears down
on government bureaucracies under all systems of government.
Arguments for humanitarian intervention in the form of offers
of assistance are more likely to fail when they have to overcome
accepted norms of international conduct, bureaucratic immobility,
political qualms as well as diplomatic complications. Where the
vital interests of a state are not at stake, the effectiveness of norms
of international law is enhanced. In areas of humanitarian concern
more than in some others, states are likely to abide by the resolutions of international organizations in conflicts in which they are
not directly involved. In areas of humanitarian concern, therefore,
the significance of United Nations action is pronounced, for such
action can call for and permit offers of contributions and assistance
in circumstances in which single states may hesitate to come forward.
In inertial conditions, relatively weak thrusts of power could have
far-reaching effects.
21. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. V, No. 8, at 121 (1958).
22. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1968, at 4, col. 4.
23. See, e.g., editorial by Anthony Lewis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26. 1970, at 46.
col. 3; Documents: Biafra-The Case for United Nations Intervention, 2 N.Y.U.J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 407 (1969); see also, for a highly critical analysis, How the State
Department Watched Biafra Starve, 6 Ripon Forum 8 (1970).
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B. United Nations Intervention for the Protection of Human Rights
1. South Africa
It is established United Nations practice that the General
Assembly has jurisdiction over situations involving serious breaches
of Charter provisions which deal with human rights. Questions
pertaining to human rights are not considered to be essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of states since the Assembly has
authority to consider all breaches of the Charter. 24 The gross violations of human rights in the Republic of South Africa have provoked
energetic responses by the United Nations and by the specialized
agencies. These responses have varied widely: from verbal condemnations, 25 the exclusion of South Africa from some of the
benefits of U.N. membership,2 6 the investigation of complaints, the
hearing of witnesses and the receipt of petitions as well as the
legitimation of the struggle against apartheid and appeals to all
states to provide political and material assistance to the people of
South Africa in their legitimate struggle.27 The General Assembly
has also requested the Security Council to take enforcement action
under Chapter VII of the Charter to meet the problem of apartheid.28
More recently the United Nations has been considering the
possibility of establishing judicial machinery for the indictment of
South African government officials for crimes under international
law committed in the territory of Namibia (South-West Africa).2D
The jurisdictional barrier of Article 2(7) of the Charter, excluding intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states, has failed to stem the tide of international action
against the practice of apartheid, but it has withstood much more
effective attempts to intervene in other situations involving alleged
24. U.N. Charter art. 10; J. Carey, U.N. Protection of Civil and Political
Rights 12 (1970).
25. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2547, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 55, U.N. Doe.
A/7630 (1970); G.A. Res. 2506, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969); and G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218

(1968).
26. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2506, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969), [1963] Yearbook of the U.N. 19, 604 (1965).
27. G.A. Res. 2671, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
See also note 25 supra.
28. See G.A. Res. 2671, supra note 27. See also G.A. Res. 2506, 24 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 30, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
29. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2547, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 55, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1970); Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern
Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/979/Add.3 (1969); See also comments by states on the
proposal to establish a judicial committee for Namibia, U.N. Doc. A/8057 (1970).
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breaches of human rights. In 1967, in a change in United Nations
practice, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations
was authorized by the Economic and Social Council to make a
thorough study of situations which reveal "a consistent pattern of
violations" and to report with recommendations thereon to the
Economic and Social Council. 30 At its 1968 session, the Commission
on Human Rights declined, however, to take action on the situation
in Greece and Haiti which, in the view of the Sub.Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, had
3
revealed a consistent pattern of violations. '
2. The Middle East
The United Nations also took action to preserve the human
rights of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel
as a result of hostilities in the Middle East in 1967. This is
a significant instance in which the United Nations acted vigorously
to protect civilians in an international armed conflict. The General
Assembly, the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights
and the International Conference on Human Rights have all adopted
resolutions on this subject.32 Both the General Assembly and the
Security Council considered that essential and inalienable rights
should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war 3 3-so far a
principle acted upon by the United Nations only in connection
with the 1967 war in the Middle East. The principal organs of the
U.N. have taken no such action regarding the suffering of civilian
populations in the large scale international conflicts in Cambodia,
Vietnam and Laos or in the domestic conflicts in Sudan, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Chad, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Pakistan. The Assembly
thus took no public action to assist Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia
or to provide help to the families of the more than one million
victims of the war in Vietnam.
In the Middle East, however, the Secretary-General acting under
30. U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1. at 17. U.N. Doe.
E/4393 (1967). See Carey, supra note 24, at 85.
31. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 6/44 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 4. at 59.64.
U.N. Doc. E/4475,E/CN 4/972 (1968).
32. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 6, 44 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 4, at 151.

U.N. Doc. E/4475, E/CNA/972 (1968); Respect for and Implementation of Human
Rights in Occupied Territories (Resolution adopted by International Conference
on Human Rights), U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 32/41, at 5 (1968); G.A. Res. 2252. E.S. 5
U.N. GAOR, Supp. I, at 3, U.N. Do. A/6798 (1967); 22 U.N. SCOR, 1361st meeting 9, U.N. Doc. SJRES/237 (1967).

33. GA. Res. 2252, E.S. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/6798 (1967);
22 U.N. SCOR, 1361st meeting 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (1967).
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a Security Council resolution dispatched a Special Representative
to report on the situation of the population in areas under Israeli
control, on the measures taken to shelter and to facilitate the return
of those who had fled and on the treatment of prisoners of war and
the protection of civilians.3 4 The Secretary-General had informed
his Special Representative that the provisions of the Security Council
resolution under which he was acting might properly be interpreted
as having application to the treatment of Jews in the Arab states8 5
The Special Representative then sought information on their fate
notwithstanding their status as citizens of the Arab states concerned.
The United Arab Republic objected to this interpretation. A projected second humanitarian mission to the Middle East did not
materialize bec-ause no agreement could be reached on the tasks
of such a mission.3 6 The humanitarian resolution passed by the
Assembly also appealed to governments, organizations and individuals to make special contributions to alleviate the suffering
inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of
hostilities. 37 Contributions were made in the form of money, transport, supplies and other facilities.
The humanitarian action of the United Nations in the wake
of the Middle East War was significant from two standpoints. First,
the Security Council made it pogsible for the Representative of the
Secretary-General to assert his competence to investigate the fate
of civilians in their country of citizenship. Second, the Organization
asserted its authority to request special contributions for the relief
of all populations in the area of war. The United Nations thus set
a precedent which might be applicable also in wars of a noninternational character.
3. Pakistan
During the Pakistan civil war in 1971, the Secretary-General
has pursued a policy somewhat bolder than the one he had followed
in the Nigerian civil war. Despite the domestic character of the
conflict, U Thant used his right of initiative to offer assistance,38
34. 22 U.N. SCOR, 1361st meeting 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (1967); Report by
the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES.V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967), U.N. Doc. S/8124, A/6787, at 12 (1967).
35. Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2252
(ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967), U.N. Doc. S/8158, A/6797, at
59 (1967).
36. Id. at 60. See further U.N. Doc. S/8553, A/7085 (1968).
37. See note 32 supra.
38. U.N. Doc. SG/SM/1474 (1971).
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referring to his great concern about the situation in East Pakistaii
in light of reports from U.N. personnel in the area. He was mindful
of his responsibilities including those governing non-interference in
a state's internal affairs. But he also asserted the authority of the
U.N. to promote human well-being and humanitarian principles.
He felt that the U.N. and its specialized agencies have a most useful
role to play, with the consent of governments, in providing emergency assistance for the population of an area afflicted by civil war.
One month after his initial appeal, U Thant let it be known that
Pakistan had responded to his appeals and had requested assistance
from the U.N. family. 39 This followed active diplomacy by the
Secretary-General and an initial negative response by the Government of Pakistan which had indicated that international assistance,
if and when required, would be administered by Pakistan's own
relief agencies. The Secretary-General's initiative in this situation
confirms the inherent authority of his office with regard to humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in civil wars.
II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITED NATIONS ACrxON

A. ProblemsPresented by the HumanitarianIntervention of
Sovereign States
It is not always easy to appreciate what a United Nations resolution can do to help civilian victims of conflicts that cannot be
done by direct diplomacy and relief. Article 2(7) of the Charter, as
already noted, prohibits intervention in matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of states. On occasions, the mere offer
of help has been considered an unfriendly act. Significantly, in the
1930's the United States refused even to protest the open persecution
of Jews in Germany, adhering strictly to the doctrine of non.intervention.40
The difficulties caused by this doctrine have created problems
also for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian assistance is a political weapon highly prized by both government and dissidents in a civil war and a potent force when siege
warfare is the technique adopted for overcoming enemy resistance.4 1
The 1949 Geneva Red Cross Conventions permit intervention by
39. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. VIII, No. 7 at 26-27 (1971).
40. See, S. Friedlander, Pius the Twelfth and the Third Reich (1966); A.
Morse, While Six Million Died (1968).
41. See G. A. Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 International
Lawyer 228 (1970).
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impartial humanitarian bodies, such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross, in international and in non-international conflicts
alike. The Conventions also oblige parties to ensure respect for
their provisions in all circumstances. They stipulate, however, that
no action in a non-international conflict shall prejudice the rights
or status of parties to such a conflict.
Where impartial humanitarian bodies such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross may feel free to offer assistance, sovereign governments with their far greater resources do not believe
they have equal freedom, as the lack of an American response to
the German persecution of the Jews indicates. Thus, in the absence
of a government's invitation for assistance and in the absence of
an international instrument providing for such help, a United
Nations resolution calling for contributions could be used as a
license to tender help. It could supply the diplomatic justification
for offers of relief materiel and personnel which might otherwise
be construed as inimical intrusions and as attempts to support one
of the parties to a non-international conflict. This diplomatic consideration has special relevance for the United States. The United
States intervened unilaterally (at first) in the Dominican Republic
in 1965, formally to protect its nationals threatened by the armed
conflict in that country and to escort them back home. This was
the initial explanation given by President Johnson for military
operations in the Caribbean which evidently also had other political
42
objectives.
In another incident, in November 1964, a battalion of Belgian
paratroopers was flown in American transport planes from Ascension
Island, a British possession, to rescue 1700 civilians, mostly white,
held as hostages by Congolese rebels in the Stanleyville region of
the Congo. The United States and Belgium reported these activities
to the President of the Security Council. 43 A group of African and
42. Announcement by President Johnson, August 28, 1965, in N.Y. Times,
April 29, 1965, at 14, col. 1:

I've ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops
ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in
the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This
same assistance will be available to the nationals of other countries, some of
whom have already asked for our help.
On this whole episode, see A. J. Thomas, Jr. & A. V. W. Thomas, The
Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, in the report of the Hammarskjold Forum of
the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York (J. Carey, ed. 1967).
43. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of Amer.
ica to the President of the Security Council, Nov. 24, 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6062
(1964); Letter from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the President of
the Security Council, Nov. 24, 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6063 (1964).
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other states asked for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider
the Stanleyville operation which they alleged constituted "an intervention in African affairs, a flagrant violation of the Charter of
the United Nations and a threat to the peace and security of the
African continent.""4 The political effects of this action left their
mark on United States policy towards Nigeria and in the attitude
of some African states. From a legal and diplomatic standpoint the
Stanleyville and Dominican Republic operations were not alike.
Whereas the Stanleyville operation was explained as a "humanitarian mission," 45 the Dominican affair was justified by reference
to another doctrine, the "protection of nationals." 40
Any movement of United States personnel and equipment to
a foreign country necessarily awakens fears and suspicions about
American objectives. These were revived in the fall of 1970 when
the U.S. sent humanitarian assistance and field hospitals to Jordan
during the civil war with Palestinian organizations. Similar fears
and concern also arose, for example, during the debate over assistance
to the population of East Pakistan in the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee in May, 1971. Members of Congress were evidently
fearful that humanitarian assistance might lead to a more direct
involvement of the U.S. in the East Pakistan conflict. In a statement
to the Subcommittees this writer argued that assistance through
international agencies would not constitute the beginning of yet
another foreign involvement. 47 To understand this fear one should
recall that humanitarian motives have frequently been invoked
over the last 150 years by powerful states to cover crude political
designs. Hitler, for example, accounted for his invasion of Poland
48
and Czechoslovakia as acts designed to rescue German minorities.
44. Letter to the President of the Security Council, Dec. 1, 1964, U.N. Doe.
S/6076 (1964). See also R. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, 324f (1968).
45. U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964).
46. See note 42 supra.
47. Hearings on the Crisis in East Pakistan Before the Subcomm. an Asian
and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 92d Cong., Ist Sess..
12-24 (1971).
48. Proclamation by Adolf Hitler to the German army, in N.Y. Times. Sept.
1, 1939, at 1,col. 8:
To the defense forces:
The Polish nation refused my efforts for a peaceful regulation of neighborly
relations; instead it has appealed to weapons. Germans in Poland are persecuted with a bloody terror and are driven from their homes. The series of
border violations, which are unbearable to a great power. prove that the
Poles no longer are willing to respect the German frontier. In order to put
an end to this frantic activity no other means is left to me now than to meet
force with force.
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Humanitarian intervention by sovereign states presents, therefore, general problems that are not merely legal but political to
the highest degree. Genuine humanitarian intervention should meet
at least three requirements: it must be (a) kept free from political
objectives, (b) authorized by appropriate international instruments,
and (c) impartially carried out by a humanitarian body. To satisfy
these requirements, suitable methods for overcoming the political
obstacles which exist must be found. Political opposition to humanitarian relief measures call for corresponding political responses.
Political opposition to humanitarian relief measures can lead either
to the politicization of relief or to its emasculation. The separation
of humanitarian and political concerns requires therefore the agreement of concerned states and organizations to its maintenance. The
political obstacles to humanitarian relief have proved to be indeed
40
the more formidable ones.
An attempt to provide for humanitarian intervention in limited
circumstances has been made in General Assembly Resolution 2717
(XXV)5 0 for assistance in natural disasters. This Resolution plainly
contemplates the offer of emergency assistance, but it does not,
however, provide for assistance to civilian populations in armed
conflicts either of an international or of a non-international character. In Resolution 2675(XXV),r1 adopted in December, 1970, the
General Assembly reaffirmed the principle adopted by the Istanbul
Conference of the Red Cross 5 2 that the provision of international
relief to civilian populations in armed conflicts is in conformity with
49. Palmer, Magnitude and Complexity of the Nigerian Problems, 59 Dep't
State Bull. 357 (1968); Moore, International Relief Efforts in Nigeria id. at 484;
Katzenbach, The Tragedy of Nigeria, id. at 653. For criticism of State Department's policies, see the Ripon Society report, supra note 23. See also Hetrings
on Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
50. G.A. Res. 2717, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971),
see also Comprehensive Report of the Secretary-General, Assistance in Cases of
Natural Disaster, U.N. Doc. E/4994 (1971).
On July 23, 1971, the Economic and Social Council called for the appointment of a U.N. disaster relief coordinator in a major departure from previous
U.N. practice. This action goes a long way towards implementing the recommendations for a U.N. Emergency Assistance Service. The mandate of the Coordinator
under the terms of the ECOSOC resolution would not be limited to natural dis.
asters. Action on this resolution will be taken in the 26th General Assembly. Res.
1612[LI], U.N. Doc. E/5073.
51. G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
52. Declaration of Principles for International Humanitarian Relief to the
Civilian Population in Disaster Situations, Resolution XXVI adopted by 21st
International Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, 1969, International Review
of the Red Cross, No. 104 (Nov. 1969), at 632.
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the humanitarian principles of the Charter. The establishment of
machinery for international assistance to these populations was
further studied in a significant Report of the Secretary-General on
Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts.53 This question

was also examined by a Conference of Experts called by the IGRC
in 1971. 54 These developments followed the presentation of a proposal made by this writer to the President's Commission for the
Observance of Human Rights Year, 1968, and to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees for the establishment of a U.N.
Emergency Assistance Service for all disasters.5 This proposal was
endorsed by the Kennedy Subcommittee and was followed by a
policy statement by the Nixon Administration favoring better
arrangements for coordinating international assistance for the victims of natural and man-made disasters.50
In connection with the crisis in East Pakistan, the SecretaryGeneral has decided to send a representative to Pakistan as a "focal
point" to coordinate and work out the modalities of extending
assistance to the civilian population in the East.57 This may well
mark the beginning of U.N. assistance to civilian populations in
the wake of armed conflicts along lines similar to those contemplated in natural disaster situations, implementing in effect some
central features of the proposal for the establishment of a U.N.
Emergency Assistance Service. Resolution 2675(XXV)8 which permits in general terms humanitarian assistance for civilian populations in armed conflicts could help some governments overcome
their scruples in coming forward with offers of contributions. It
could also provide the formal basis for requests for assistance by
governments that may otherwise refrain from turning to other
governments for help. Foreign offices could then point to the authorizing text of the United Nations resolution and private aid organi53. U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969) and U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970).
54. Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law. International Comm. of the Red Cross, The Conference of Government Experts,
Report on the Work of the Conference 84 (1971).
55. G. Gottlieb, Topics: A New Humanitarian Venture for the U.N., N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1970, at 26, col. 3 (city ed.); Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess., U.S. Assistance to Refugees Throughout the Wi'orld 3. 70-72
(Comm. Print 1969); Final Report, President's Commission for the Observance of
Human Rights Year 1968, at 60 (1969).
56. Report by President Nixon to Congress, United States Foreign Policy for
the 1970's-Building for Peace, 7 We&ly Compilation of Presidential Documents
305, 373 (1971).
57. Press Release of the Secretary-General SG/SM/1478 (fay 19, 1971).
58. Note 51, supra.
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zations might also find it easier to secure government cooperation
in relief efforts. This resolution is the first of a number of steps
contemplated by the U.N. and the ICRC for the development of
international law and practice.
B. Community Expections Concerningthe HumanitarianMission of
the United Nations.
The imponderables of elite sensibilities and ideologies have, in
the past twenty-five years, contributed to unexpected and farreaching political changes. The scope and intensity of anti-colonialism and the resulting rise in the United Nations membership from
50 to more than 130 were not generally foreseen in 1950 any more
than the emerging isolationism of the United States generated by
the Vietnam conflict was foreseen in 1960. Characteristically, both
developments were deeply shaped by the perceptions and expections of relatively small groups. This should be mentioned at a
time when projections for the future focus increasingly on objective
data of a technological, demographic and economic nature. Such
projections often leave out non-objective considerations based upon
ideology and expections.
In the Western world the sensitivity of large classes of society
to the brutality of armed conflicts enhanced by television coverage
of hostilities may have had a part to play in the intensity of anti-war
opposition. Conversely, gross violations of human rights in a large
number of countries in all regions of the world have heightened
both cynicism about and concern for humane values. These conflicting phenomena have found expression in the generation gap,
and in the United States in a renewed interest in the treatment
of the Blacks, the Indians, the poor and in the plight of inhabitants
of developing countries.
Youthful political leaders with fine antennae for such attitudes,
like Prime Minister Palme of Sweden and the Kennedy brothers,
have understood and shared the moral concern of the young for
refugees, victims of war, the Ibos in Nigeria, the Blacks in South
Africa and the population of Vietnam. In Europe the wave of
sympathy for the Dubcek experiment, the yearning for a "socialism
with a human face," for "participation and imagination" during the
May events in Paris were all emotionally related in a Zeitgeist elevating humane concerns above technical exploits and military triumphs. This concern is, however, by no means universal. Relative
indifference to the massacre of nearly half a million alleged communists in Indonesia, to the civilian victims in the struggle against
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the Kurds in Iraq, Royalists in Yemen and to the events in East
Pakistan underscores the less than global nature of this concern.
The domestic character of most situations in which serious
violations of human rights have occurred has inhibited United
Nations action. 59 The Organization was thus unable to take measures
against Greece similar to those taken by the Council of Europe. co
Complex procedural advances in human rights protection recommended by the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination
against Minorities have gone unnoticed save by the expert few. 01
Continued flagrant violations of human rights in South Africa have
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of international consensus in
human rights matters. The increasing politicization of the Commission on Human Rights itself and bureaucratic difficulties in handling
petitions from victims of persecutions have helped to spread disillusionment with the United Nations. The Organization is increasingly perceived as an inefficient bureaucracy unable either to cope
with the world's problems or even to bring assistance and comfort
to the few turning to it for help.
U.N. inaction in situations in which compassion and aid are
eminently in order may be particularly grave at a time when preoccupation with the human dimension in war as in peace is becoming
increasingly felt. Humanitarian issues acquire in this light a significance perhaps not fully perceived by the tough pragmatists of
power and resources. Now as never before a United Nations with
a human face is required if the Organization is to be looked upon
as more than a trade association of government establishments.
Making allowances for the repressive nature of many governments, a strategy for restoring a modicum of prestige to the Organization could conceivably bi reconciled with the dominant Members'
concern to maintain sovereignty and freedom from outside intervention. Assistance and relief for the victims of armed conflicts and
other disasters present a field for action commanding the support
of some Member States as well as sparking sentiments of commitment
to the continued existence of the Organization itself.
The potential of blueprints for more effective action in this
field rests, therefore, in the intense ideological commitment to
humane concerns that may yet color developing trends in the foreign
policy of great nations. Historical memories of humanitarian passions raised in England by the massacre of Armenians late last
59. L. Miller, International Order and Local Disorders, 18-28 (1967).
60. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1969 at 1, col. 6.
61. See Carey, supra note 24, at 91-92.
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century and the influence of these passions on British foreign
policy serve as a reminder of the potential significance of such
62
sentiments.
III. FOUR TYPEs

OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

It has been said that existing international instruments authorize a dynamic role for impartial humanitarian organizations. It is,
therefore, not always apparent why the political limitations operating on the United Nations Secretariat and on the foreign policies
of governments should also be replicated in the work of the International Red Cross. The explanation may emerge more plainly from
a consideration of the quasi-universal acceptance of the Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross. It is due in part to its relatively
consistent policy not to break the consent barrier of governments and
to operate strictly within the limits painstakingly hewn out in the
Geneva Conventions. The ICRC has generally decided to refrain
from embarrassing sovereign states by damaging disclosures and open
condemnations of violations of the laws of war and humanity. This
policy has enabled it to carry out mercy missions even in Nazi
occupied Europe-missions that would almost certainly have been
barred if the Red Cross had publicized all it knew of Nazi practices.
It has been less successful, however, in gaining the confidence of
Asian communist regimes embattled with the United States or in
getting relief through to the civilian victims of the civil war in
East Pakistan. In adopting a morality of choosing the lesser eviloften requiring a measure of accommodation with heinous regimes
amounting almost to complicity-the ICRC has put its mercy missions above its self-righteousness. Much stands to be lost if the
only truly international humanitarian intermediary, which is also
the oldest, most universal, and best established, were to jeopardize
its access to barbarous systems of government by adopting a morality
of principle and of idealism that would threaten the effectiveness
of its mercy missions.
Traditional Red Cross policies have required both restraint and
self-control from its personnel. They have required silefice in the
face of accusations that atrocities are hushed up, and silence when
silence was the price for doing anything at all. The ICRC has thus
at times opened itself to criticism from two perspectives: (1) From
those who would adopt a morality of principle and of idealism
62. J. Nazer, The First Genocide of the 20th Century 116-18, 133 (1968),
Stowell, supra note 10.
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exposing and denouncing inhumanity wherever it is encountered;
(2) From those who would adopt a dynamic humanitarian policy
and who, like the Joint Church Aid in Nigeria, disregard political
and legal objections to relief and pursue it at the risk of losing access
to the government side in the conflict.
In addition to such criticism, the restriction on ICRC membership to Swiss citizens only and the modesty of its resources have led
to another difficult dilemma. It had either greatly to restrict the
scope of its activities or to accept extensive support from a few
wealthy nations at the risk of becoming unduly identified with
them and jeopardizing its neutrality. And it was precisely this
unique role as a neutral, impartial, humanitarian intermediary
with universal access which led to the ICRC's assumption of
responsibility for Red Cross action in armed conflicts both of an
international and non-international character.
The almost universal acceptance of, and respect for, the Red
Cross still make it a valuable instrument for international action
despite unease in some developing countries about alleged Western
domination. The ICRG has, for example, recently prepared important studies on the protection of civilian populations,03 secured the
adoption of resolutions at the Red Cross Conferences which paved
the way for subsequent U.N. resolutions 4 and convened conferences
of experts for the reaffirmation and development of the laws of
war.65 Side by side with it, a large number of private and religious
relief organizations have established a pattern of international relief
action in addition to programs conducted by UNICEF, the World
Food Program, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other international relief instrumentalities. While
some of the problems faced by civilian populations have fallen
within the competence of agencies dealing with refugees, many have
not. Problems of coordination and cooperation between the numerous international relief instrumentalities have therefore arisen.
63. Reports submitted by ICRC to XXIst International Conference of the
Red Cross (Istanbul 1969): Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts
(Geneva, May 1969) D.S. 5ab; Reaffirmation and Development of Laus and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, May 1969) D.S. 4a. b, c: Implementation and Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions (Geneva, Apr. 1969) D.S. 3/1
a and b. International Review of the Red Cross, Nov. 1970. No. 116, at 620.
64. Resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red
Cross in Vienna, Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, International Review of Red Cross, June 1970. No. 111.
p. 308-309. The first three principles of the resolution were adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly, GA. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1969).
65. See note 54 supra.
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Other "humanitarian organizations" within the meaning of
Article 3 of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions have been able to
operate on a more dynamic construction of the terms of the Conventions and to bring relief to non-combatant victims of civil wars
notwithstanding objections of recognized governments. In Nigeria
these objections centered upon the control of relief and methods
of distribution of the kind referred to in Article 23 of the Fourth
Geneva Red Cross Convention. 66 Joint Church Aid relief flights to
Biafra-controlled territory over the objections of the Federal Military
Government in Lagos demonstrated that the operations of ad hoc
associations and private relief organizations were relatively immune
to many of the long-term political considerations that must be
weighed by the ICRC. Relief of this nature, however, is likely to
be limited both in extent and in duration. Ad hoc private relief
organizations can therefore adopt a dynamic humanitarian policy
founded on a broad interpretation of the Red Cross Conventions
which permanent humanitarian organizations can ill afford to
follow.
The maintenance of moral humanitarian standards in the face
of massacres, atrocities and the decimation of civilian populations
requires also the exposure and condemnation of such practices.
This role can ill be assumed by relief organizations fearful of
jeopardizing their own activities. Religious, moral and political
leaders may have to undertake the burden of exposing abuses leaving
humanitarian relief organizations free to do their own work in
silence. Occasionally, trials and investigations may also be appropriate for the enforcement of these standards.
Experience with humanitarian relief in the recent past suggests
a fourfold division of international humanitarian concerns reflecting
the delicate nature of political considerations in this area:
-Neutral Humanitarianism. This is pursued by the ICRC, as a
universally acceptable, neutral intermediary prepared to work with
governments of all kinds for humanitarian ends and to refrain from
publicizing abuses which might jeopardize humanitarian missions.
It does not preclude the ICRC from acting and taking initiatives
based on a very broad interpretation of the Geneva Conventions.
-Revolutionary Humanitarianism.This is practiced by private voluntary relief organizations engaged in humanitarian intervention
over political and legal objections of governments involved in civil
66. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 7, art. 23. Strictly speaking, and in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary, this article should apply only to conflicts of
an international character. See also id., arts. 2, 3.
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strife and which are prepared to be excluded from the government
side of such conflicts.
-Moralistic Humanitarianism.This involves leadership, investigation and exposure of massacres and atrocities and other violations
of humanitarian instruments leading to the repression of such
violations.
-International Humanitarianism.This could be the role of United
Nations machinery for managing political objections to relief and
for marshalling relief units on a large scale. This is also the role
of international agencies such as UNICEF, the League of Red Cross
Societies and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
Little can be gained from expecting every humanitarian organization to fulfill all these roles simultaneously or from criticizing the
Red Cross, for example, for not exposing war crimes. Though the
temptation is strong for humanitarians to give expression to their
moral outrage as well as to try to help the victims of barbarous acts,
the best results can be achieved by keeping these principal roles or
concerns separate. There is, therefore, not only room, but a positive
need for the continued operation of a multiplicity of humanitarian
agencies, some assuming one role, others a combination of different
concerns.
The Nigerian civil war episode is rich in lessons about the risks
of playing more than one humanitarian role at a time. Thus,
attempts by the ICRC to extend relief beyond the limits acceptable
to the Nigerian government led to the suspension of its relief flights
when an ICRC plane was shot down over Biafra-controlled territory
by government aircraft. With the collapse of Biafran resistance, the
Lagos government continued to shun the Swiss Committee despite
the suspension of flights. The urgency of civilian suffering also led
the ICRC to accept considerable support from a small group of
Western countries led by the United States, some of which were
suspected of harboring political designs in Nigeria. The Committee's vascillating course between neutral humanitarianism and revolutionary humanitarianism exposed it to criticism from all sides and
deepened divisions within it. It led to suggestions that the more
representative League of Red Cross Societies assume responsibilities
also in conflict situations. The division of functions between the
League and the Committee had, however, just been decided upon in
an agreement between them which provided for a League role pri67
marily in peacetime relief.
67. -International Comm. of the Red Cross, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies
(Geneva 1969).
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The cost of revolutionary humanitarianism to private relief organizations became apparent soon after the collapse of Biafra when
the Lagos government announced that it would have nothing to do
with organizations that had continued to fly, over its objections, to
Uli Field in Biafra-held territory. Clearly, if all humanitarian organizations had indulged in revolutionary humanitarianism the situation
in the aftermath of war would have been even more serious. Nigeria's
very hostile reaction to a Papal pronouncement on the dangers of
genocide demonstrated the importance of keeping relief and moralistic activities separate. The Quakers, for example, who had kept
their relief efforts quiet and shunned publicity and condemnations
of all kind, could thus continue to operate effectively.
International humanitarianism through UNICEF succeeded
precisely because of that Organization's sensitivity to the attitude
of the Government in Lagos. UNICEF's success in Nigeria may have
had something to do with its being allowed to resume operations
in East Pakistan within weeks -of the outbreak of the civil war.
International humanitarianism is likely to be particularly responsive
to the expectations of receiving states. Revolutionary humanitarianism, on the other hand, responds to the needs of insurgents in rebelcontrolled territories, there being no need for "revolutionary" humanitarianism in order to offer assistance to recognized governments.
International humanitarianism is also more likely to be susceptible
to political pressures within international organizations and to the
will of political majorities. It is therefore distinct from revolutionary
humanitarianism which can ride roughshod over objections of a
diplomatic or juridical character. In complex situations in which
political obstacles to relief are numerous, it is likely that these
various types of humanitarian activity will take place side by side.
In the 19th century humanitarian concerns received their impetus in Europe and in North America. The establishment of the
anti-slavery societies and the work of Christian missionaries provided a background for the beginning of humanitarian intervention
policies of the major powers of the Concert of Europe.0 8 In this
century, the advent of total warfare, of guerrilla warfare and of
unparalleled atrocities, committed not only by totalitarian regimes,
have dwarfed the work performed by private relief organizations.
If humanitarian traditions are to survive the relative decline
68. R. Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement 151-89, 223-24, 244-50
(2d ed. 1964); R. Coupland, Wilberforce, 398-404, 448, 450-51 (1923); F. Klingberg, The Anti-Slavery Movement in England 131-70 (1926); W. Mathieson, Great
Britain and the Slave Trade 1839-1865, at 1, 9-10 (1929).
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in the power of Europe and of the Christian churches, they must
be adapted to the expectations and cultures of the newly independent states. Impartial humanitarian intervention cannot, in the
present age, remain the prerogative of any one race, faith or nation.
In assuming a leadership in humanitarian affairs, new states can
draw on the great traditions of the Eastern religions and filn a
vacant role. While international humanitarian assistance requires
facilities and personnel normally available only in relatively developed societies, it is developing countries that usually find themselves
in need of such assistance. When disasters strike they are generally
poorly equipped to face them without outside help. International
humanitarian assistance can frequently lead to a unilateral flow of
personnel and supplies across the dividing lines between wealthy
societies and developing states which frequently also correspond to
racial color lines. Japan is practically the only non-white country
with the capability to extend emergency assistance on a large scale
to stricken societies.
Assistance from Western states can only exacerbate national
pride in countries recently freed from colonial- domination and
acutely preoccupied by threats to their sovereignty and independence.
The intrusion of white men and of foreign teams can be both
humiliating and irritating at a time of national distress. Developing
societies have moreover grown wary of the activities of some western
missionaries who have not infrequently treated local populations as
hordes of savages in need of salvation. Missionaries in South Africa,
for example, were frequently seen to have given no mean assistance
to colonial rulers and entrepreneurs in the name of humanitarian
and religious ideals. Moreover, memories of colonial excesses have
contributed their share of scepticism about the genuineness of the
white man's humanitarian commitments. Africans rapidly learned
to distrust any white presence in their midst. This distrust may
have contributed to the mixed reception which the ICRC encountered in the Nigerian conflict.
The humanitarian doctrines emanating from Europe were
thus tarnished by their very origin and by the record of European
powers. They fell, moreover, on some singularly unreceptive cultures
many of whom were accustomed to the waging of total wars on
tribal enemies. Humanitarianism can appear as a somewhat peculiar
notion in societies in which local economic and social conditions
as well as the almost total absence of medical care mean widespread
disease, high mortality rates and the acceptance of one's destiny
in the best of times.

HeinOnline -- 4 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 425 1971

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS [VOL. 4: 403
The survival of humanitarian traditions is equally threatened
in the United States which is embroiled in counter-insurgency warfare against the NLF in Vietnam. Movements for bringing the war
to an end have largely overshadowed the puny efforts to lend
effective assistance to the civilian population of Vietnam and to
protect it from the ravages of combat and bombing. The will to
help threatened populations in other countries is held in check by
a fear of new involvements in foreign conflicts and civil wars.
In such an international climate, there is an acute need for
leadership in restoring a dimension of compassion to the turbulent
politics and merciless natural environment of the Third World. An
assumption of moral leadership would do much to heighten the
prestige and morale of the countries and organizations involved.
Unless leaders from the countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa
assume this role, humanitarian traditions may become the preserve
of a shrinking group of political and religious leaders increasingly
ineffectual in their activities in other parts of the world.
At this juncture in the history of the community of nations, the
governing policy considerations for the development of international
humanitarian law and organizations require restatement:
-Humanitarian policies must first be adapted to the expectations and sensibilities of new states and to their fear of intervention in order to make them universally acceptable again.
-Emergency assistance under U.N. auspices requires the consent
of Member States receiving such assistance.
-Where political objections to humanitarian relief efforts are
evident, political efforts should be made to overcome them,
efforts best conducted by a representative international organization to avoid direct Big Power involvement.
-Recognition must be given to the different types of humanitarian concerns and to the need for a multiplicity of humanitarian relief agencies, both public and private.
-Efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations and of other
international institutions should not be permitted to jeopardize
the activities of existing international humanitarian organizations.
-Effective humanitarian assistance must be pursued by appropriate international agencies to lessen the prospects for a direct
involvement of big powers in foreign conflicts.
-Efforts to secure universal acceptance of humanitarian poli.
cies should not lead to the erosion of standards set in the
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Geneva Red Cross Conventions and in other international
instruments.
-No new international organization should be established
where existing ones could be adapted or enlarged to perform
additional tasks.
There is some evidence that efforts to enhance the United
Nations role in emergency assistance is beginning to bear fruiL3
But assistance to war victims is an area of international concern in
which almost everything remains to be done.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAKISTAN SITUATION**

The Situation in East Pakistan.
The quick succession of tragic events in East Pakistan has left
hundreds of thousands of persons dead and injured and has generated an exodus of over nine million refugees to India. After the
greatest natural disaster of the century in 1970, a bloody civil war
began in March of this year. To deal with the humanitarian
problems, the United Nations has undertaken two separate operations, one in East Pakistan, the other in India.
In an unusual and unprecedented form of activity for the United
Nations, U Thant initiated a United Nations East Pakistan Relief
Operation (UNEPRO) without any supporting resolution from any
United Nations organ. He acted because, as he put it, "I felt that
my obligations under the Charter must include any humanitarian
action which I could take to save the lives of large numbers of
human beings."70 The operations in East Pakistan were launched
solely on the basis of President Yahya Khan's acceptance of U
Thant's offer of humanitarian assistance by and through the United
Nations for the relief of the distressed people of East Pakistan.
President Yahya Khan gave his full support for the United Nations
operation being set up in such a way as to enable the Secretary
General to give contributors and donors the requisite assurances
that the relief provided by and through the United Nations was
reaching those for whom it was destined, the people of East
Pakistan.
**As this issue was going to press, events in Pakistan resulted in important
developments of relevance to this topic; this appendix contains an analysis of
those developments.
69. See note 50 supra.

70. Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Press Release
SG/1763/IHA/93 of November 17, 1971.
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The agreement between the Secretary General and the Government of Pakistan was finalized by an exchange of letters on November 15 and 16 outlining the "conditions for the effective discharge
of the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation."7 1 Two days
later however, Paul-Marc Henry, in charge of UNEPRO at headquarters, warned that "the extreme difficulties under which this
operation is being carried out" were jeopardizing "the conduct of
the operation, its effectiveness and perhaps even the possibility of
continuing it."72 Substantial opposition to the operation has developed from the Mukti Bahini, the armed forces of the Bangladesh
Government which had declared the independence of East Pakistan.
The Bangladesh forces have felt that UNEPRO has unwittingly been
made to serve the ends of the West Pakistan "military occupation
forces" and of the Razakar militia. Attacks on UNEPRO facilities
and personnel have led one week after Paul-Marc Henry's warning
to the recall of some UNEPRO personnel from East Pakistan and
to the apparent collapse of the operation in the wake of increasing
hostilities in the Province. 73 The United States has so far contributed
$93.3 million to UNEPRO. 74 The insurgency in the East is spreading
and the Mukti Bahini are reportedly increasingly effective.
The Situation in India.
The civil war in East Pakistan has through the summer of 1971 led
to an immense tide of refugees to India. According to the Government of India this figure was 9,744,404 as of November, while the
Government of Pakistan estimated that the number of persons
displaced from East Pakistan was 2,002,623 on September 2. Pursuant\
to a request from the Indian Government for humanitarian aid, the
Secretary General has designated the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, as the focal point for the
coordination of assistance from all the organizations and programs
of the U.N. system. A general consensus now exists on the need for
the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their home. Such repatriation cannot take place however until a return of normalcy in the
area. This normalcy could only have followed a political settlement
71. The terms of this unprecedented agreement are set out in the Secretary
General's press release, id.
72. United Nations Press Release, GA/SHC/1717/IHA/947 of November 19,
1971; U.N. Doc. A/C/3/SR. 1877 (November 18, 1971).
73. N.Y. Times, November 25, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
74. See United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN193(71) of November 19, 1971, for a U.S. policy statement on Humanitarian Assistance in South Asia.
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between the Government of Pakistan and the elected representatives
of the people of East Pakistan. Full scale war between India and
Pakistan has not changed the situation. In the meantime, the focal
point of the United Nations system has concentrated its efforts on
emergency relief for the refugees in India and on the promotion of
their voluntary repatriation at the earliest possible time. The Consortium of governments interested in India's economic development
estimated on October 26th the cost of relief for refugees at $700
million for the year ending in March 1972. The world wide contributions pledged came to over $200 million. 75 It should be pointed
out that the High Commissioner's actions in discharging his focal
point duties are entirely separate from UNHCR's usual activities
and that presumably he is not responsible to the Executive Committee of UNHCR with respect to these activities70 .
United Nations Emergency Assistance.
The near collapse of UNEPRO should not be allowed to cloud
the important initiative of the Secretary General and the outstanding work of U.N. personnel in India and in Eas Pakistan. U.
Thant's unchallenged and explicit assertion that the Charter requires the Secretary General to take humanitarian action, without
any enabling resolution if need be, to save the lives of human
beings in time of civil war is an important development in the
authority of the Office of Secretary General under the Charter. It
restores the Secretary General's leadership in humanitarian matters
which had been found wanting during the Nigerian civil war. The
troubles of UNEPRO also point to the necessity during conflicts
not of an international character of securing the consent of all
parties to the conflict in order to facilitate the functioning of U.N.
relief operations. To continue UNEPRO it would have been necessary for the Secretary General to secure not only the agreement of
the Government of Pakistan but also that of the Bangladesh insurgents. It should be kept in mind that such a purely humanitarian
agreement should not affect either the rights or the status of the
parties to the conflict in East Pakistan under the principles outlined in Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
The dimension and 61an of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's operations in India and of UNEPRO have already in some degree gone
75. United Nations Press Release IB/2684 of October 28, 1971.
76. For a comprehensive statement of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, see U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1876 (November 18, 1971).
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beyond the measures contemplated in the Economic and Social
Council resolution 1612 [LI] adopted in Geneva in July for the
appointment of a Disaster Relief Coordinator. The UNHCR focal
point in India, UNEPRO and the ECOSOC resolution have already
put into effect the United Nations Emergency Assistance Service
advocaited by this writer along principles reviewed in a Panel of the
American Society of International Law.
United Nations emergency assistance is unfortunately likely to
be needed again. In light of full scale war between India and
Pakistan, of the Mukti Bahini's operations, and following Indian
recognition of Bangladesh Independence a renewed United Nations
effort to come to the assistance of the civilian population in the
area will now probably be again required.
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